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“A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE”?:  
BARTLETT GOING FORWARD 
Steven A. Schwartz* 
 
This Note addresses the question of whether federal law preempts state 
design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers regardless of 
which test state law uses to determine whether a drug is defective.  This 
issue, arising out of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of preemption 
jurisprudence and fundamental tort law as stated in Mutual Pharmaceutical 
Co. v. Bartlett, is significant because it plays a large role in determining to 
what extent generic drug manufacturers are immune to civil liability arising 
out of injuries caused by their generic drugs.  In an age of rising medical 
costs and jury awards, both plaintiff and defendant, and the political arena, 
are considerable stakeholders. 
First, this Note provides an overview of the battle over the Food and 
Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulatory authority, preemption 
jurisprudence (highlighting physical impossibility preemption), design 
defect law, and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Second, this Note 
introduces the conflict among the lower courts as to whether the type of test 
a jurisdiction uses to determine a product’s defectiveness plays any role in 
an analysis of applicable FDA regulations’ preemptory effect on state 
design defect law.  Finally, this Note concludes that after Bartlett, so long 
as state design defect law adheres to strict liability principles, federal law 
preempts state design defect causes of action against generic drug 
manufacturers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In November 2006, Denise Neeley was prescribed the prescription drug 
Reglan to treat her gastroesphageal reflux disease1 (GERD).  GERD, which 
is essentially severe or chronic acid reflux disease or heartburn,2 is a 
common ailment that affects approximately 5 to 7 percent of the 
population.3  Although Neeley’s prescription called for her to receive the 
brand name version of the drug, she was provided with, and ultimately only 
ingested, metoclopramide (MCP), a generic version produced by various 
drug manufacturers.4  In April 2010, Neeley was diagnosed with the disease 
tardive dyskinesia, allegedly due to ingesting MCP.5  Tardive dyskinesia is 
a disease commonly associated with involuntary movements in the face.6  
Neeley allegedly experienced abnormal and inadvertent body movements, 
pain, breathing issues, and weight loss.7 
Following her injuries, Neeley sued the generic drug manufacturers that 
produced MCP, alleging that MCP had a design defect.8  The generic drug 
manufacturers, however, argued that federal law preempted state design 
defect claims against generic drug manufacturers.9  The Eastern District of 
Missouri held that federal law did not preempt these claims and hence 
Neeley’s design defect suit against the generic manufacturers could 
 
 1. See Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-325 JAR, 2013 WL 
3929059, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 29, 2013). 
 2. Heartburn/GERD Health Center, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/heartburn-
gerd/guide/heartburn-gerd-basic-information-causes (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/QB8P-CCQY]. 
 3. Press Release, Int’l Found. for Functional Gastrointestinal Disorders, GERD Costs 
America Nearly $2 Billion Each Week in Lost Productivity (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.iffgd.org/site/news-events/press-releases/2005-1125-gerd-costs [http://perma.cc/ 
UPU7-G9EY]. 
 4. See Neeley, 2013 WL 3929059, at *1. 
 5. See id.; Second Amended Complaint at 19 ¶ 99, Neeley, 2013 WL 3929059 (No. 
4:11-CV-325). 
 6. Tardive dyskinesia, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000). 
 7. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 16 ¶ 82. 
 8. See id. at 23 ¶ 123. 
 9. See Neeley, 2013 WL 3929059, at *7. 
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proceed.10  Therefore, Neeley could have her claims adjudicated and 
potentially receive a sizeable settlement or jury award to compensate her for 
her injuries.11 
This result lies in sharp contrast with the experience of Lirlene Gardley-
Starks, who was prescribed and ingested MCP, just like Neeley.12  She too 
claimed to have developed tardive dyskinesia.13  She then sued various drug 
manufacturers, including four generic drug manufacturers, alleging they 
produced a drug with a design defect.14 
Despite the striking similarities between Neeley’s and Gardley-Starks’s 
claims, the Northern District of Mississippi held that federal law did 
preempt Gardley-Starks’s design defect claim.15  Even though Neeley and 
Gardley-Starks alleged that they took the same generic drug and it caused 
the same ailment, Gardley-Starks had no opportunity to receive a jury 
award or settlement, while Neeley did. 
In reaching these disparate results, both courts relied on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,16 
which held that federal law preempted design defect claims under New 
Hampshire law pursuant to the doctrine of physical impossibility because it 
would be impossible for generic drug manufacturers to both comply with 
state requirements and federal requirements.17  Since Bartlett, some lower 
courts, such as those in Neeley’s and Gardley-Starks’s cases, have 
disagreed over whether the test that state design defect law uses to 
determine if a product is defective should affect the analysis of whether the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations preempt state design 
defect law.18  In Bartlett, the Court evaluated New Hampshire’s design 
defect law, which applies the risk-utility test to determine whether a product 
is defective.19  However, not all jurisdictions use the risk-utility test; some 
jurisdictions apply the consumer expectations test.20  Furthermore, even 
those jurisdictions that do use the risk-utility test do not always apply it the 
same way that New Hampshire does.21  Instead, some courts apply slight 
variations of the risk-utility test.22  These variations evaluate different 
 
 10. See id. at *10. 
 11. See, e.g., Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2013) 
(awarding plaintiff twenty-one million dollars in compensatory damages by jury for design 
defect lawsuit against generic drug manufacturer). 
 12. See Gardley-Starks v. Pfizer, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (N.D. Miss. 2013), aff’d 
No. 4:10–CV–099–SA–JMV, 2013 WL 5423951 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2013). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. at 599–601, 611. 
 15. See Gardley-Starks, 2013 WL 5423951, at *3. 
 16. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 17. See id. at 2473. 
 18. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 19. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474–75. 
 20. See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing development and use of consumer expectations test). 
 21. See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing development and use of variations of the risk-utility 
test). 
 22. See infra Part I.C.3. 
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factors23 and consider the knowledge that the manufacturer will be assumed 
to have known.24 
After Bartlett, if a state’s design defect test does not make a difference, 
FDA regulations—which constitute federal law25—preempt state design 
defect lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers by injured consumers, 
severely inhibiting the injured consumer’s ability to recover monetary 
damages for injuries.26  If a state’s design defect test does make a 
difference, the consumer’s ability to recover monetary damages perhaps 
will not be as bleak.27 
The majority of the courts that have addressed this issue hold that federal 
law preempts state design defect lawsuits against generic drug 
manufacturers regardless of the test that the jurisdiction uses to determine 
defectiveness of a drug.28  These courts hold, as stated by the Southern 
District of Illinois, that the characteristics of the different design defect tests 
are a “distinction without a difference.”29 
This result, however, has not been unanimous.  The Eighth Circuit, the 
Eastern District of Missouri, the Illinois Appellate Court, and the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court have each found that the differences between 
the design defect test used creates a distinction that may preclude FDA 
regulations from preempting design defect suits against generic drug 
manufacturers.30 
This Note analyzes the various design defect regimes within the 
impossibility preemption framework expanded upon by Bartlett and 
determines whether there really is a “distinction without a difference.”  Part 
I provides an overview of the current state of the FDA’s authority, federal 
preemption jurisprudence (ultimately highlighting impossibility 
preemption), the various tests that jurisdictions use to determine whether a 
product is defective, and, finally, the Supreme Court cases Wyeth v. 
Levine,31 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,32 and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. 
Bartlett.33  Part II describes the division in the lower courts stemming from 
 
 23. See infra Part I.C.3.a (discussing alternative design requirement); infra Part I.C.3.c 
(discussing Restatement (Third):  Products Liability’s version of the risk-utility test). 
 24. See infra Part I.C.3.b (discussing prudent manufacturer test). 
 25. See Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2476 (2013). 
 26. See infra Part II.B. But see In re Darvocet, Darvon, and Proproxyphene Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 929–30 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussing “parallel misbranding” theory); 
Conte v. Wyeth, 168 Cal. App. 4th 89, 109–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (adopting “pioneer 
liability”). 
 27. See infra Part II.A (discussing cases in which FDA regulations were found not to 
preempt state design defect law). 
 28. See infra Part II.B (discussing cases in which FDA regulations were found to 
preempt state design defect law). 
 29. In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
3:13–cv–10143–DRH–PMF, 2014 WL 1632149, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2014). 
 30. See infra Part II.A. 
 31. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 32. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
 33. 133 U.S. 2466 (2013).  In 2013, following Bartlett, the FDA proposed new generic 
drug labeling rules. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved 
Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be 
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Bartlett’s treatment of New Hampshire’s design defect regime.  Part II then 
introduces commentary regarding this lower court split.  Part III resolves 
this conflict by analyzing the doctrinal interaction between strict liability 
and preemption in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartlett and 
general tort law principles.  Lastly, Part III concludes by discussing the 
ramifications of this analysis. 
I.  PREEMPTION AND DESIGN DEFECT TESTS 
Part I of this Note provides background on the legal principles involved 
in Bartlett.  Part I.A tracks the FDA’s recent battle over preemption.  Part 
I.B discusses the fundamentals of preemption law, highlighting physical 
impossibility conflict preemption.  Part I.C discusses design defect law.  
Finally, Part I.D examines two important cases leading up to Bartlett— 
Levine and Mensing—and then Bartlett itself. 
A.  The Political Background of the FDA’s Authority over the State 
At a 2002 symposium hosted by the Food and Drug Law Institute, Daniel 
Troy suggested that because the FDA holds “broad authority” to regulate 
drug labeling under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA), this dual 
layer of coverage created the risk of parties having inconsistent obligations 
under the FDCA and state law.34  In December 2003, at a drug and medical 
device litigation conference, Troy told the audience to recommend lawsuits 
in which the FDA might be able to intervene—make them “sound like a 
Hollywood pitch.”35  What made Troy’s actions significant was his 
occupation:  Chief Counsel of the FDA.36 
Around this time, the FDA filed unsolicited amicus briefs in various 
cases, expressing the view that the FDA impliedly preempted state law.37  
One of these briefs, for example, argued “the prospect of hundreds of 
individual juries determining the propriety of particular device approvals, or 
the appropriate standards to apply to those approvals, is the antithesis of the 
orderly scheme Congress put in place and charged FDA with 
implementing.”38 
The FDA’s position in these briefs was contrary to its position just a few 
years earlier.  Previously, then-FDA Chief Counsel Margaret Jane Porter 
indicated that the “FDA’s view is that FDA product approval and state tort 
 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314 and 601).  The implications of the potential adoption of these 
rules are outside the scope of this Note.  As of the date of publication, these rules have not 
been approved. 
 34. Margaret H. Clune, Stealth Tort Reform:  How the Bush Administration’s Aggressive 
Use of the Preemption Doctrine Hurts Consumers, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM 2 (Oct. 
2004), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/preemption.pdf [http://perma.cc/EH72-
77D3]. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. at 1–2. 
 37. See id. at 4–7. 
 38. Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Murphree v. Pacesetter, No. 
005429-00-3 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 2003), cited and quoted in Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 
F.3d 163, 171 n.13, 178 (3d Cir. 2004); see Clune, supra note 34, at 4. 
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liability usually operate independently, each providing a significant, yet 
distinct, layer of consumer protection.”39  This view was similarly posited 
in an FDA amicus brief in 1996.40 
The administration of President George W. Bush justified the FDA’s 
changing view on a new cost-benefit analysis.41  The FDA argued that it 
was now properly calculating for the risk added by the FDA’s regulatory 
measures, in addition to the actual risk associated with the devices.42  Tort 
reform was a policy goal of President Bush.43  As Governor of Texas, 
President Bush helped to enact seven tort reform bills, one of which made it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to receive punitive damages by increasing the 
burden of proof and reducing punitive damage liability.44  President Bush 
argued that product liability tort lawsuits increase prices in the healthcare 
sector and thus burden the economy as a whole.45 
This policy followed Bush into the White House and would become one 
of the goals of his administration.46  President Bush attempted to achieve 
this goal through federal legislation47 and by having the government submit 
amicus briefs in medical drug and device litigation, to mixed success.48 
In 2006, the FDA published a formal statement in the Federal Register 
discussing the extent of the FDA’s preemptive reach.49  In particular, this 
statement stated that it was necessary for FDA regulations to preempt state 
products liability lawsuits in order to ensure that state tort lawsuits did not 
 
 39. Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision:  FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 7, 11 (1997). 
 40. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Smith Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. 
Kernats, No. 96-1405, 1997 WL 33561767 (1997); see Clune, supra note 34, at 2. 
 41. See Clune, supra note 34, at 7. 
 42. See id. at 7–8. 
 43. See id. at 8. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id.; Jordyn K. McAfee, Medical Malpractice Crisis Factional or Fictional?:  An 
Overview of the GAO Report as Interpreted by the Proponents and Opponents of Tort 
Reform, 9 J. MED. & L. 161, 166 (2005) (“President Bush maintains that the high costs of 
medical malpractice premiums are due to excessive damage awards . . . .  [I]f there are caps 
that disallow high damage awards it would lead to a decrease of medical malpractice 
premiums.”). 
 46. See Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 339, 351 (2010). 
 47. See McAfee, supra note 45, at 164–66 (discussing Bush’s then-proposed federal 
legislation); see also BRADLEY M. JONES & MARY BYRNE FLETCHER, MEAGHER & GEER 
PLLP, HOW THE LITIGATION CLIMATE IN THE USA HAS CHANGED SINCE OBAMA BECAME 
PRESIDENT AND THE DEMOCRATS TOOK CONTROL OF CONGRESS 9 (2009), 
http://www.meagher.com/files/upload/acb.pdf (arguing that the only significant Bush tort 
reform legislation was the Class Action Fairness Act, and the Bush Administration’s tort 
reform successes derived from state legislation and federal court rulings) 
[http://perma.cc/7BBB-NTDG]. 
 48. See James M. Beck, Federal Preemption in FDA-Regulated Product-Liability 
Litigation:  Where We Are and Where We Might Be Headed, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 657, 683 
(2009). 
 49. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933–36 (Jan. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Requirements 
on Content and Format]; see Beck, supra note 48, at 684. 
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interfere with the FDA’s labeling determinations.50  The crux of the FDA’s 
argument was based on concerns of “defensive labeling.”51  Under this 
theory, the prospect of state litigation can add pressure on manufacturers to 
warn consumers about risks that may be speculative, which in turn 
discourages the safe and effective use of products and encourages second-
guessing of FDA determinations in litigation.52 
In May 2009, President Obama fought back against FDA preemption.53  
In a memorandum directed to executive department and agency heads, 
President Obama provided instructions for all agencies regarding 
preemption determinations.54  President Obama’s memorandum directed 
departments and agencies not to rely upon uncodified preemption preamble 
provisions, to review whether preemption regulations are still justified 
under traditional preemption principles every ten years, and to refrain from 
codifying preemption provisions when not justified under traditional 
preemption principles and Executive Order 13,132.55  In response to 
President Obama’s memorandum, in October 2011, the FDA issued notice 
that it had in fact reviewed its preemption preambles and codifications from 
the past ten years and deemed that three of its preemption preambles were 
not legally justified.56 
As one commentator notes, the Obama Administration, despite its earlier 
efforts to limit FDA preemption, actually supported the generic drug 
manufacturer’s preemption claim in Bartlett.57  The government even 
submitted an amicus brief to the Court indicating this view.58  Unlike other 
cases,59 Bartlett “directly challenge[d] the FDA’s very authority to approve 
a product in the first place” and initiated concerns over the future of 
biomedical innovation.60  Because other support for preemption 
 
 50. Requirements on Content and Format, supra note 49, at 3967; see Beck, supra note 
48, at 684–85. 
 51. Requirements on Content and Format, supra note 49, at 3935; see Beck, supra note 
48, at 686. 
 52. Beck, supra note 48, at 685–86. 
 53. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Preemption of State Common Law by 
Federal Agency Action:  Striking the Appropriate Balance That Protects Public Safety, 84 
TUL. L. REV. 1203, 1219 (2010). 
 54. Memorandum from the Administration of Barack Obama, Memorandum Regarding 
Preemption (May 20, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Presidential-
Memorandum-Regarding-Preemption [http://perma.cc/HB7T-XTLW]; see Schwartz & 
Silverman, supra note 53, at 1219–20. 
 55. Memorandum from the Administration of Barack Obama, supra note 54; see 
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 53, at 1220; see also Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 43,255, 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (ensuring “the principles of federalism established by 
the Framers guide the executive departments and agencies in the formulation and 
implementation of policies”). 
 56. Preemption Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 61,565, 61,565–66 (Oct. 5, 2011). 
 57. Tevi Troy, The Best Prescription for Pre-emption, WALL STREET. J.  
(Mar. 18, 2013 7:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873238696045783 
68080602288500 [http://perma.cc/574M-7HSB]. 
 58. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (No. 12-142), 2013 WL 314460. 
 59. See infra Part I.D.1 (discussing Wyeth v. Levine and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing). 
 60. See Troy, supra note 57. 
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unsurprisingly came from pharmaceutical companies, this created a 
situation of “strange bedfellows.”61 
B.  Federal Preemption 
The doctrine of preemption is rooted in the U.S. Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause.62  Under this doctrine, courts are handed the task of 
determining whether federal law has the effect of nullifying state law.63  
The Court has applied preemption under three different theories:  express, 
field, and conflict preemption.64 
1.  Express Preemption 
Express preemption analysis occurs when federal legislation explicitly 
states federal law’s effect on state law65 or enumerates the state laws that 
Congress does not want the statute to nullify.66  Ultimately, when engaging 
in an express preemption analysis, a court must ascertain what the clause 
itself means and determine from its meaning whether the clause nullifies 
state law.67 
2.  Field Preemption 
Another type of preemption is “field preemption.”68  A court will find 
field preemption occurs when it concludes, “that Congress has intended 
 
 61. SCOTT GOTTLIEB, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., COURT CASE COULD UNDERMINE DRUG 
APPROVAL PROCESS (2013), https://www.aei.org/publication/court-case-could-undermine-
drug-approval-process; see THOMAS MCGARITY, CENT. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, ANOTHER 
SKIRMISH IN THE PREEMPTION WAR:  DOES FDA APPROVAL TRUMP STRICT LIABILITY? (2013), 
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=5F199697-B315-8C86-
A26F5A4D15C6FCA3 (arguing the content of the amicus brief is inconsistent with 
President Obama’s memorandum on preemption) [http://perma.cc/H9SH-X847]; Rich Samp, 
DOJ/FDA Brief in SCOTUS Generic Drug Preemption Case Hands  
Plaintiffs New Liability Theories, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2013, 12:21 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/01/30/dojfda-brief-in-scotus-generic-drug-preemption 
-case-hands-plaintiffs-new-liability-theories/2/ (noting that in its amicus brief, the 
government “went out of its way to propose a brand new cause of action that, in the federal 
government’s view, would survive preemption”) [http://perma.cc/A8VP-PV8F]. 
 62. See, e.g., Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013) 
(“Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that require a private party to violate federal law 
are pre-empted and, thus, are ‘without effect.’” (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 
725, 746 (1981))); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution and the Laws of the 
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 63. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id.; see e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77–84 (2008) (applying an 
express preemption analysis). 
 66. See Nelson, supra note 63, at 226–27; see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (2012) 
(“Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter 
does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.”). 
 67. See Nelson, supra note 63, at 227. 
 68. See id. 
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federal law to be the exclusive law in a certain area of regulation.”69  Unlike 
express preemption, field preemption allows a court to find that federal law 
preempts state law without a direct conflict.70  Courts can infer this occurs 
when the “‘federal regulatory scheme’ may be ‘so pervasive’” as to make 
reasonable the inference that “Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”71  Additionally, courts infer preemption where “‘the federal 
interest’ in the field that a federal statute addresses may be ‘so dominant’ 
that federal law ‘will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on 
the same subject.’”72 
3.  Conflict Preemption 
Federal law also may preempt state law under the doctrine of “conflict 
preemption.”73  Conflict preemption is divided into two categories:  
“obstacle” and “physical impossibility.”74 
Under obstacle preemption, federal law preempts state law if the state 
law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”75  Under “physical impossibility” 
preemption, the theory of preemption that the Bartlett majority analyzed,76 
a court will examine the feasibility of the actions required by state law with 
respect to those actions required by federal law.77  Where federal law and 
state law each impose different obligations via statute on the same subject 
matter, a court determines whether it would be “literally impossible for 
someone to comply with both statutes.”78  When two statutes impose 
contradictory positive requirements, federal law preempts state law.79  For 
example, if a federal law states that one must drive on the right side of the 
road, and a state law states that one must drive on the left side of the road, 
the federal law will be upheld.80  However, for federal law to preempt state 
law, the physical impossibility doctrine requires that the state law require 
an activity that federal law prohibits, or vice versa.81  For example, in 
 
 69. Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION 
CHOICE 125 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). 
 70. See id. at 126. 
 71. Nelson, supra note 63, at 227 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947)). 
 72. Id. at 227 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). 
 73. See id. at 227–28. 
 74. See Schroeder, supra note 69, at 131. 
 75. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see Schroeder, supra note 69, at 132; 
see, e.g., Geier v. Am. Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000) (finding design defect claim 
against car manufacturer for failure to equip car with airbag preempted under obstacle 
preemption because it “would have stood as an obstacle to the gradual passive restraint 
phase-in that the [Department of Transportation] regulation deliberately imposed”). 
 76. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Schroeder, supra note 69, at 131. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See generally Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). 
 80. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 
S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (No. 12-142) (Alito, J.). 
 81. See Erika Fisher Lietzan & Sarah E. Pitlyk, Thoughts on Preemption in the Wake of 
the Levine Decision, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 225, 227 (2010). 
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Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Marketing & 
Bargaining Board,82 the Court held that federal law did not preempt state 
law because the state law was “permissive” rather than “mandatory.”83 
Physical impossibility preemption gets considerably murkier where 
federal law has enacted a positive requirement that is seemingly contrary to 
common law as opposed to a statute.84  Since Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
Inc.,85 the Court has engaged in a debate as to whether common law truly 
creates a “requirement” imposed by state law.86  The question is whether 
state common law creates a positive duty upon parties due to its regulatory 
effect on human behavior, or whether it is not a “requirement,” but merely a 
cost that the manufacturer must internalize.87 
C.  Determining Defect 
As stated in section 402A, comment a of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (“Restatement (Second)”), “[t]he rule [of design defect] is one of 
strict liability, making the seller subject to liability to the user or consumer 
even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of 
the product.”88  As implemented in section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second), following Judge Traynor’s opinions in the Supreme Court of 
California cases Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno89 and 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,90 strict liability is concerned with the 
status of the product itself—that is, whether the product sold is 
“defective.”91 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) endorses the following test for 
strict products liability: 
(1)  One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to 
his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, 
and 
 
 82. 467 U.S. 461 (1984). 
 83. Id. at 478 n.21. 
 84. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption:  An Institutional 
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 459–71 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “tort 
as regulation” and “tort as compensation” jurisprudence). 
 85. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 86. See Sharkey, supra note 84, at 459–71. 
 87. See id. 
 88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 89. 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 90. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).  The opinions of Judge Richard Traynor are traditionally 
viewed as establishing the doctrine of strict liability. See, e.g., Tellez v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 
No. BC 312 852, 2008 WL 744052, at *9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2008) (“[T]he doctrine of 
strict liability was created by Greenman . . . .”). 
 91. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 290 (2005).  While section 402A 
actually refers to this as “defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” courts have not 
applied the term any differently when referred to as “defective,” “unreasonably dangerous,” 
“defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” or similar terms. See id. at 263–64. 
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(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2)  The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered 
into any contractual relation with the seller.92 
In order to be found liable, the manufacturer must produce a product that 
is “defective” or “unreasonably dangerous.”93  This raises an important 
question:  When do we want “defect” or “unreasonable danger” to be 
found?94  Courts and academics have formulated different answers to this 
question.95 
The following sections discuss the different tests that courts use to 
determine defect.  Part I.C.1 discusses the consumer expectations test.  Part 
I.C.2 discusses the traditional risk-utility test.  Part I.C.3 discusses 
variations of the risk-utility test.  Part I.C.4 discusses variations that merge 
the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests.  Finally, Part I.C.5 
discusses true absolute liability. 
1.  The Modern-Day Minority:  Consumer Expectations Test 
When courts were first handed the task of determining the meaning of 
“defect” or “unreasonable danger” within section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second), they initially looked to the Restatement’s comments for 
guidance.96  The Restatement (Second) contained two relevant comments 
which offered the courts guidance:  comment g and comment i.97  Both of 
these comments state that a determination of “defect” should ultimately be 
based upon the expectations of consumers.98  As a result, in the 1960s and 
1970s following the publication of the Restatement (Second), this was the 
majority view of courts.99  A typical formulation of the test would ask a 
jury whether “the manufacturer’s product failed to perform as safely as an 
ordinary consumer would expect.”100 
 
 92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 290. 
 95. See infra Part I.C.1–2. 
 96. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 292. 
 97. See id. at 292–93. 
 98. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 
1965) (“The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves 
the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be 
unreasonable to him.”); id. cmt. i (“The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond 
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the 
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.”). 
 99. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 293. 
 100. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 303 (Cal. 1994); see also Mikolajczyk v. 
Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 352 (Ill. 2008) (“The jury is asked to make a single 
determination:  whether the product is unsafe when put to a use that is reasonably 
foreseeable considering its nature and function . . . .  No evidence of ordinary consumer 
expectations is required, because the members of the jury may rely on their own experiences 
to determine what an ordinary consumer would expect.” (citation omitted)). 
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Although various commentators have pointed out the several flaws in the 
consumer expectations test,101 some courts have continued to apply it and 
reject any alternative.102 
2.  The Risk-Utility Test 
Realizing the problems associated with application of the consumer 
expectations test, courts presently tend to measure defectiveness of design 
in the form of a risk-utility test.103  Furthermore, this is the approach 
presently adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability 
(“Restatement (Third)”).104 
Generally, the risk-utility test involves “a balancing of the probability 
and seriousness of harm against the costs of taking precautions.”105  Under 
this rule, liability may not be found when the costs of avoiding a hazard are 
deemed to be foreseeably greater than the resulting benefits.106  Conversely, 
liability may be found where the benefits from preventing such a danger 
exceed or outweigh any costs associated with it.107 
Different jurisdictions may consider different factors when performing 
this cost-benefit analysis.108  While some jurisdictions have taken a more 
expansive approach,109 courts will generally refer to the factors 
recommended by Dean John Wade.110  Under the “Wade Factors,” a court 
will direct a jury to look to (1) the usefulness and desirability of the 
product, (2) the product’s safety aspects, (3) the availability of a substitute 
 
 101. First, the consumer expectations test inhibits injured parties from recovering 
damages for injuries caused by obvious dangers. See David G. Owen, Design Defect Ghosts, 
74 BROOK. L. REV. 927, 942 (2009).  Second, it prevents injured bystanders from recovering 
damages. See Gomulka v. Yavapai Mach. & Auto Parts, Inc., 745 P.2d 986, 989 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1987) (“The consumer expectation test does not apply to bystanders, at least in design 
defect cases, because a person who . . . is not using the product may be entirely ignorant of 
its properties and of how safe it could be made.”).  Third, it has been criticized as too vague 
for juries to properly apply. See Horst v. Deere & Co., 2009 WI App 75, ¶ 95, 319 Wis. 2d 
147, 769 N.W.2d 536, 558; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving 
Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 882 (1998) (calling the 
consumer expectations test “so vague as to be lawless”). 
 102. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 296. 
 103. See id. at 301. 
 104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
1998) (“[T]he test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have 
reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission 
of the alternative design by the seller or a predecessor in the distributive chain rendered the 
product not reasonably safe.”). 
 105. OWEN, supra note 91, at 303 (quoting Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 935 
(8th Cir. 1976)). 
 106. See id. at 303–04. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. at 499–504. 
 109. See id. at 499; see, e.g., Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 675 (Ga. 1994) 
(“[N]o finite set of factors can be considered comprehensive or applicable under every 
factual circumstance, since such matters must necessarily vary according to the unique facts 
of each case.”). 
 110. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 500–01; see also John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict 
Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837–38 (1973) (proposing the Wade Factors). 
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product that would serve the same function in a safer manner, (4) the 
manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product 
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its 
utility, (5) the user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the 
use of the product, (6) the user’s ability to anticipate awareness of the 
dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, and (7) the feasibility 
on the part of the manufacturer of spreading the loss.111 
3.  Modifications and Reformulations of the Risk-Utility Test 
While the risk-utility test is the most commonly used test  to determine 
defect, different jurisdictions employ different variations of it.  This section 
explores these variations.  Part I.C.1.a discusses the alternative design 
requirement.  Part I.C.2.b discusses the prudent manufacturer test.  Finally, 
Part I.C.3.c discusses the Restatement (Third)’s variation. 
a.  Alternative Design 
One of the Wade Factors requires a jury to consider and evaluate the 
feasibility and reasonableness of an alternative design.112  The Restatement 
(Third) suggests that this should be a requirement, not merely one factor for 
a jury to consider.113  Similarly, many jurisdictions require proof of a 
feasible alternative design to prove defectiveness under the risk-utility 
test.114  Normally, the injured plaintiff will hold the burden of proof on the 
issue of alternative design.115  Other states, however, while not requiring 
the proof of an alternative design, will allow it to be considered in the 
process.116  Finally, some states have completely rejected a jury’s 
consideration of an alternative design due to the high cost plaintiffs endure 
to prove it and the alternative design requirement’s perceived low value.117 
 
 111. See Akee v. Dow Chem. Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1132 (D. Haw. 2003); Wade, 
supra note 110, at 837–38. 
 112. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
1998).  James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski argue that this is the “consensus view” 
and that the minority jurisdictions may accept it “given time for reflection.” Henderson & 
Twerski, supra note 101, at 920. 
 114. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 506; see, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 
So.2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. 
Corp., 554 So.2d 927 (Ala. 1989). 
 115. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 506–07. 
 116. See id. at 507. 
 117. See id.; see also Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H. 
2001).  One commentator argues that it ignores the complexity of modern day products, 
increases the expense of lawsuits, assumes that consumers are insured, is contrary to strict 
liability’s purpose in making lawsuits and recovery by plaintiffs easier, will prevent certain 
lawsuits from being brought that will increase hazards of dangerous products, and fails to 
bear the inherent costs on the manufacturer. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) 
of Torts:  Products Liability Section 2(b):  The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 
61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1423–24 (1994).  Another commentator sees the Restatement 
(Third)’s inclusion of this requirement as a result of special interest advocates manipulating 
caselaw. See Patrick Lavelle, Crashing into Proof of a Reasonable Alternative Design:  The 
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b.  The Prudent Manufacturer Test 
The prudent manufacturer test, also commonly referred to as the 
“hindsight test” or the “Wade-Keeton test,” is applied in some 
jurisdictions.118  Under this test, a jury is instructed to impute knowledge 
regarding the products’ condition to the manufacturer.119 
 As stated in Dorsey v. Yoder Co.,120 under the prudent manufacturer test, 
“the proper test of ‘unreasonable danger’ is whether a reasonable 
manufacturer would continue to market his product in the same condition as 
he sold it to the plaintiff with knowledge of the potential dangerous 
consequences the trial just revealed.”121  This test allows jurors to account 
for information about a product’s risk that may have been revealed after the 
time of the design, or even after the accident itself.122  Despite the 
disassociation or repudiation of the test by both of its original proponents, 
Dean John Wade and W. Page Keeton,123 some jurisdictions continue to 
adhere to the hindsight test.124 
The prudent manufacturer test is not a unique test in and of itself, like the 
consumer expectations test, but rather a version of the risk-utility test where 
knowledge developed from the record is imputed upon the manufacturer.125  
Jurisdictions that do support the viability of the prudent manufacturer test 
apply it along with the risk-utility test, as it is a version of the risk-utility 
test.126 
For example, in Golonka v. General Motors Corp.,127 in a design defect 
action against an automobile manufacturer, the Court of Appeals of Arizona 
analyzed how a jury should determine defectiveness under this test.128  The 
 
Fallacy of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 1059, 1101 
(2000). 
 118. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 532; see also Ray ex rel. Holman v. BIC Corp., 925 
S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tenn. 1996) (“Wade-Keeton” test); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d 876, 
881 (Ariz. 1985) (“hindsight test” and “prudent manufacturer test”). 
 119. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 531. 
 120. 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
 121. Id. at 759–60. 
 122. See JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW:  RESPONSIBILITY AND REDRESS 959 (3d. 
ed. 2012). 
 123. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 533.  They had both argued for the application of this 
test independently in a series of articles. See id. at 530–31. 
 124. See id. at 533–54 (citing a state statute in Tennessee, and courts in Arizona, New 
York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Montana, and Mississippi, that continue to adhere to the 
hindsight test). 
 125. See Privette v. CSX Transp. Inc., No. 02-5312, 2003 WL 22514347, at *9 (6th Cir. 
Nov. 4, 2003) (“To prevail under the prudent manufacturer test, a plaintiff must establish 
that [sic] ‘that the product because of its dangerous condition would not be put on the market 
by a reasonably prudent manufacturer or seller, assuming that the manufacturer or seller 
knew of its dangerous condition.’ . . .  This determination involves a risk-utility 
analysis . . . .”); Dominick Vetri, Order Out of Chaos:  Products Liability Design-Defect 
Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1373, 1395 (2009) (“The [prudent manufacturer test] . . . generally 
relies on risk-utility evidence and analysis, but frames the jury question in terms of what a 
reasonable manufacturer would have done in the circumstances.”). 
 126. See Vetri, supra note 125, at 1395–98. 
 127. 65 P.3d 956 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
 128. See id. at 963. 
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court found that the information that the trial revealed should be imputed to 
the manufacturer, and then the risk-utility factors should be applied in 
“hindsight” to decide whether it was reasonable for the manufacturer to put 
the product on the market.129  Thus, the court demonstrated how the aspect 
of hindsight can be applied alongside the risk-utility test. 
c.  The Restatement (Third)’s Reformulation 
The Restatement (Third) contains arguably one of the more defendant-
friendly formulations of the test for design.130  Section 6(c) of the 
Restatement (Third) states: 
A prescription drug . . . is not reasonably safe due to defective design if 
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are 
sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that 
reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and 
therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug . . . for any class of 
patients.131 
While this standard has been highly criticized,132 recently some courts 
have been willing to accept the Restatement (Third)’s design defect 
analysis.133  For example, in Haffner v. Stryker Corp.,134 the Colorado 
District Court determined whether a plaintiff stated a plausible claim 
regarding his design defect suit against the manufacturer of a knee 
replacement system.135  The plaintiff claimed that the knee replacement 
system was defectively designed because it contained substances, nickel 
and cobalt, to which 19 percent of the population is allergic or sensitive, 
despite there being hypoallergenic alternatives available.136  The court 
 
 129. See id.; see also Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997) (“[W]e 
conclude that, in a strict products liability case, knowledge of any undiscovered or 
undiscoverable dangers should be imputed to the manufacturer.”). 
 130. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under 
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts:  A Reporter’s Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 
471 (1996). 
 131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(C) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 132. See Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 838–40 (Neb. 2000) 
(arguing that the test misstates the law, is difficult to apply, is inflexible, and cannot be 
defeated easily by an expert witness); George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1133 (2000) (“The 
process of selecting a design should be informed by the knowledge that the designer 
someday may have to justify the particular balance it chose between risk and utility.  Such 
thoughtful consideration of the need to justify design choices ultimately will result in better, 
safer products.”); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for 
Prescription Drugs:  The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 76 (1994) (“[A] near-immunity standard provides too much 
protection for manufacturers and too little protection for consumers.”). 
 133. See ANDREW SOLOW ET AL., KAYE SCHOLER LLP, THE EVER-SHIFTING LANDSCAPE IN 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG DESIGN DEFECT LITIGATION 7 (2014), http://www.kayescholer.com/in-
the-market/publications/articles/20140204-shifting-landscape-in-prescription-drug-design-
defect-litigation-product-liability/_res/id=sa_File1/solow-anziska-meyers-product-liability-
article.pdf [http://perma.cc/WB4G-KMT8]. 
 134. No. 14-CV-00186-RBJ, 2014 WL 4821107 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2014). 
 135. See id. at *1. 
 136. See id. at *3. 
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dismissed these claims, citing the Restatement (Third), and held that 
“medical devices can be safe for certain patient populations and not others 
without their risk outweighing their utility.”137 
4.  Consumer Expectations and Risk-Utility Come Together 
While certain jurisdictions consider the consumer expectations and risk-
utility tests to be mutually exclusive, several jurisdictions have abandoned 
that approach and accommodate each test in different circumstances.138  
First, some jurisdictions allow either of these tests to be proven to hold a 
manufacturer liable for design defect.139  Under the jurisdictions that apply 
the “two-pronged approach,” a plaintiff may establish design defect through 
either the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility test.140  For 
example, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,141 the Supreme Court of 
California held that a product may be deemed defective 
(1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product  failed to perform as safely 
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or 
reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves 
that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the defendant 
fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors . . . that on balance the 
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in 
such design.142 
 Second, some jurisdictions will apply the tests in different situations.143  
For example, in Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,144 the Maryland Court of 
Appeals held that the consumer expectations test applies to design defect 
cases unless the product malfunctions, in which case the risk-utility test 
applies.145 
Third, some jurisdictions may use one test as part of the other test, 
effectively combining the two tests into one.146  For example, in Potter v. 
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,147 the Supreme Court of Connecticut held 
that one of the factors that may be considered within the consumer 
expectations test applied by the state may be the risk-utility factors.148 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. See David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 MO. L. REV. 291, 336–64 (2008).  
 139. See id. at 341. 
 140. See id. at 341–42. 
 141. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
 142. Id. at 457–58 (emphasis added). 
 143. See Owen, supra note 138, at 346–53. 
 144. 792 A.2d 1145, 1153 (Md. 2002). 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Owen, supra note 138, at 335–41. 
 147. 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997). 
 148. See id. (“[A] consumer’s expectations may be viewed in light of various factors that 
balance the utility of the product’s design with the magnitude of its risks.”); see also Delaney 
v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) (“[W]e . . . recognize the validity of 
risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining the expectations of consumers in complex 
cases.”). 
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5.  No Test for Defect:  True Absolute Liability 
In a true absolute liability regime,149 in order to make a prima facie 
claim, a court does not need to find that the defendant was at “fault.”150  
Rather, a plaintiff’s injury must merely be causally related to the product, 
regardless of whether the defendant took the utmost care and whether there 
was a defect in the product.151 
True “absolute liability” and “strict liability” in tort are distinct concepts 
despite some commentators’ and courts’ willingness to use these terms 
interchangeably.152  True absolute liability means that there is no excuse 
that will prevent liability so long as it was actually the defendant that 
caused the injury.153  Meanwhile, strict liability does not create as broad an 
assumption of liability.154  Rather, in strict liability, the defendant is only 
liable if a jury finds that the product that caused the injury was defective.155  
Unlike true absolute liability, strict liability requires a court to determine 
that a product was defective before liability can be found.156 
The Supreme Court of Oregon identified this distinction in Phillips v. 
Kimwood Machine Co.157  When the Phillips court determined the correct 
standard for determining defect, it noted that “[t]he problem with strict 
liability of products has been one of limitation.  No one wants absolute 
liability where all the article has to do is to cause injury.”158  The court then 
explained how this limitation, in products liability law, is found:  “To 
impose liability [in true absolute liability] there has to be something about 
the article which makes it dangerously defective without regard to whether 
the manufacturer was or was not at fault for such condition.  A test for 
unreasonable danger is therefore vital.”159 
Presently, however, there are no jurisdictions that impose a true absolute 
liability design defect on drug manufacturers; in other words, no 
jurisdictions impose liability upon the manufacturer regardless of whether 
 
 149. This Note uses the terminology “true absolute liability” due to the tendency of courts 
and commentators to interchangeably use the terms “strict liability” and “absolute liability” 
despite their different meanings. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 290; Robert C. Baker III, 
Requiem for a Remedy:  The Law and Economics of Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett’s 
Over-Preemption, 74 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 81, 97–98 (2015).  When used by a court in 
this Note however, the term remains unaltered. 
 150. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 290. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id.; supra note 149. 
 153. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 290. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. at 260–61. 
 156. See id. at 290; Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and 
Corporate Decision-Making:  Greater Deterrence Through Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L. 
REV. 1361, 1430–31 n.339 (1993) (“Although liability may be imposed without fault—e.g., 
when a manufacturer knowingly places a dangerous product into the stream of commerce—
the liability is not absolute because it is created only when the product is found to be more 
dangerous than is reasonable under the circumstances . . . .”). 
 157. 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974). 
 158. Id. at 1036. 
 159. Id. 
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the product is defective.160  Rather, all jurisdictions presently impose some 
sort of fault determination, i.e., strict liability, by finding liability when the 
product is in fact defective.161 
D.  Wyeth, Mensing & Bartlett 
This section discusses the three major U.S. Supreme Court cases that led 
to the lower court split following Bartlett.  Part I.D.1 discusses the two 
Supreme Court cases that set the stage for Bartlett.  Then, Part I.D.2 
discusses Bartlett itself. 
1.  Wyeth v. Levine and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing:  Setting the Stage 
for Generic Drug Manufacturer Design Defect Preemption 
In Wyeth v. Levine,162 the Court addressed whether FDA regulations 
preempted a plaintiff’s failure-to-warn lawsuit under state law against a 
brand name drug manufacturer.163  As to impossibility preemption, the 
Court held that it was possible for a brand name drug manufacturer to 
comply with both state duties under failure-to-warn common law and 
federal statutory law.164  In Wyeth, the Court determined that federal law 
allowed brand name drug companies to unilaterally strengthen its drug 
warnings and therefore, federal law does not prohibit a brand name drug 
company from changing its label to properly warn of dangers associated 
with a drug.165  Therefore, Wyeth held that because federal law allows the 
brand name drug company to change its labeling, there is no conflict 
between state and federal law.166 
Two years later in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,167 the Court addressed 
whether FDA regulations preempted a similar failure-to-warn suit against a 
generic drug manufacturer.168  In Mensing, the Court identified the state 
and federal duties.169  First, they found that the applicable state law 
“require[s] a drug manufacturer that is or should be aware of its product’s 
danger to label that product in a way that renders it reasonably safe.”170  
Second, under federal law, the Court determined that FDA regulations 
allow generic drugs to receive approval “simply by showing equivalence to 
a reference listed drug that has already been approved by the FDA.”171  
 
 160. See JAMES L. GILBERT ET AL., LITIGATING TORT CASES § 59:60 (2014) (“[I]n no state 
is strict liability tantamount to absolute liability for injuries caused by a product.”); Tietz, 
supra note 156, at 1430–31 n.339 (1993) (“[T]his author is aware of no decision that actually 
imposes an absolute liability standard.”); Baker, supra note 149, at 97. 
 161. See supra note 160. 
 162. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 163. See id. at 558. 
 164. See id. at 572–73. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
 168. See id. at 2572. 
 169. See id. at 2573. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 2574 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2006)). 
344 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
However, FDA regulations prevented these drugs from “independently 
changing their generic drugs’ safety labels.”172 
The Court held that federal law preempted these failure-to-warn claims 
against generic drug manufacturers under the doctrine of impossibility 
preemption.173  The Court explained that if the generic drug manufacturer 
had independently changed its label to satisfy the state duty, then it would 
have violated FDA regulations which require “sameness” between a generic 
drug and its corresponding brand name drug’s labeling.174  Therefore, after 
Wyeth and Mensing, an injured consumer’s ability to sue a drug 
manufacturer on a failure-to-warn theory is severely restricted. 
2.  Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett 
Two years after Mensing, the Court decided Bartlett.  In 1978, the FDA 
approved the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug “sulindac” under the 
brand name “clinoril.”175  After its patent expired, several drug 
manufacturers—including Mutual Pharmaceutical Company (Mutual)—
produced generic versions of clinoril.176  Karen Bartlett was prescribed 
clinoril, but was ultimately given the generic version manufactured by 
Mutual and suffered from toxic epidermal necrolysis.177  Toxic epidermal 
necrolysis is a syndrome characterized by skin peeling off in a manner 
similar to that of second-degree burns.178 
Bartlett originally asserted failure-to-warn and design defect claims, but 
the New Hampshire District Court dismissed the failure-to-warn claim 
because Bartlett’s doctor admitted that he did not read the relevant 
warnings.179  However, her design defect claim was successful and resulted 
in a twenty-one million dollar verdict in her favor.180  Mutual appealed, 
arguing that FDCA and FDA regulations preempted the design defect 
claim, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.181  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard the appeal.182 
At issue in Bartlett was whether FDA regulations preempted Bartlett’s 
design defect claim against Mutual under the doctrine of impossibility 
preemption because it would be impossible for Mutual to comply with both 
federal and state requirements.183  First, the Court determined the generic 
drug manufacturers’ duties under state law.184  The Court recognized that 
 
 172. Id. at 2577. 
 173. See id. at 2577–78. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013). 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. at 2472. 
 178. Toxic epidermal necrolysis, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000). 
 179. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct at 2472. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012); see Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2472. 
 183. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470. 
 184. See id. at 2473. 
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New Hampshire adhered to design defect law as recommended by section 
402A of the Restatement (Second).185  Therefore, 
[u]nder the Restatement—and consequently, under New Hampshire tort 
law—“[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused” even though he “has exercised all 
possible care in the preparation and sale of the product.”186 
The Court then addressed Mutual’s arguments that there is no state 
duty.187  First, the Court rejected the respondent’s argument that because 
New Hampshire tort law is compensatory, and not regulatory, it did not 
create a duty.188 
Second, the Court rejected respondent’s argument that New Hampshire 
law does not impose “strict liability,” but rather “absolute liability,” and 
thus, there are no state “requirements” because absolute liability does not 
impose a duty.189  The Court rejected this argument because the argument 
failed to recognize the distinctions between jurisdictions that impose “strict 
liability” and “absolute liability.”190  As stated by the Court in Bartlett, in 
strict liability, “liability does not depend on negligence, but still signals the 
breach of a duty,” while in absolute liability, “liability does not reflect the 
breach of any duties at all, but merely serves to spread risk.”191 
The Court then proved that New Hampshire had not adopted an absolute 
liability regime, but rather a strict liability regime.192  In support of this 
claim, the Court cited a series of New Hampshire Court of Appeals cases 
noting that 402(A) strict liability ultimately imposes a duty on the 
manufacturer that requires that they produce a safe product.193 
Because the Court did not need to address whether an “absolute liability” 
regime could be preempted by the relevant FDA regulations, the Court, in a 
footnote, added:  “[w]e can thus save for another day the question whether a 
true absolute-liability state-law system could give rise to impossibility pre-
emption.  As we have noted, most common-law causes of action for 
negligence and strict liability do not exist merely to spread risk, but rather 
impose affirmative duties.”194 
The Court then determined the content of the duty New Hampshire law 
imposed.195  The Court noted that under New Hampshire’s strict liability 
 
 185. See id. (citing Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111, 112–13 
(1969)). 
 186. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965)) 
(second alteration in original). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. at 2473–74. 
 193. See id. (citations omitted). 
 194. Id. at 2474 n.1 (citing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323–24 (2008); 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992)). 
 195. See id. at 2474. 
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law, courts apply the risk-utility test to determine whether the product is 
defective.196  Under New Hampshire law, the risk-utility test requires a 
balancing of various factors, the most important being the product’s 
usefulness and desirability, feasibility of the reduction of danger without 
significant affect on the product’s effectiveness or manufacturing cost, and 
the presence and efficacy of a warning.197 
The Court then analyzed the duty that federal law imposed.198  The Court 
held that federal law prevented generic drug manufacturers from 
unilaterally changing their labels because FDCA rules required generic 
drugs to “have the same active ingredients, route of administration, dosage 
form, strength, and labeling as the brand-name drug on which it is 
based.”199  Second, the nature of sundilac’s chemical composition 
precluded redesign because it was a one molecule drug.200 
The Court then evaluated the state and federal duties and found that they 
conflicted.201  The only way for Mutual to change its “risk utility profile” 
under state law and escape liability was to strengthen its warning label.202  
Because state law required Mutual to strengthen sundilac’s warnings, and 
federal law prohibited Mutual from strengthening sundilac’s warnings, they 
conflicted.203 
The Court then addressed the so-called “stop selling alternative.”204  
Under this theory, it is not impossible to comply with both federal and state 
requirements if the generic drug manufacturer simply refrains from selling 
the generic drug.205  The Court rejected this argument because preemption 
does not require that a party, in order to satisfy both federal and state 
requirements, refrain from engaging in behavior altogether to avoid 
liability.206  Rather, the Court held that such a holding would effectively 
eviscerate the entire doctrine of preemption.207  The Court noted that in 
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every instance where impossibility preemption had been found, there would 
not have been a conflict between state and federal law if the actor refrained 
from engaging in the activity completely.208 
II.  THE LOWER COURTS DIVIDE 
Lower courts have offered divergent theories regarding how Bartlett 
should be applied.  Some jurisdictions see Bartlett’s holding as narrow and 
find room for design defects to maintain viability,209 while others view 
Bartlett’s holding as broad and suggest that no design defect claim has 
continued viability after Bartlett.210  Part II.A discusses cases that held (or 
suggested) that design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers can 
escape preemption even after Bartlett.  Part II.B discusses cases holding 
that design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers cannot escape 
preemption after Bartlett. 
A.  Courts Finding that Standard of Defectiveness 
Affects the Preemption Analysis 
While in the minority, some lower courts have found that the state’s test 
for defect does play a role in the preemption analysis after Bartlett.211  The 
Eighth Circuit suggested it could212 (although it recently backtracked 
partially),213 the Eastern District of Missouri held that design defect claims 
against generic drug manufacturers are not preempted when the consumer 
expectations test is used,214 the Illinois Appellate Court held design defect 
claims against generic drug manufacturers are not preempted when there is 
no alternative design that can be made,215 and the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court has suggested that the “absolute liability” exception theorized in a 
Bartlett footnote has present applicability.216 
1.  Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc. (Fullington I) 
In Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc.217 (Fullington I), the Eighth Circuit 
addressed whether federal law preempted a design defect claim against a 
generic drug manufacturer under Arkansas law.218  In Fullington I, the 
appellant alleged that she developed tardive dyskinesia after ingesting MCP 
 
 208. See id. But see id. at 2477 n.3 (noting an exception in “the rare case in which state or 
federal law actually requires a product to be pulled from the market—our pre-emption cases 
presume that a manufacturer’s ability to stop selling does not turn impossibility into 
possibility.” (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963))). 
 209. See infra Part II.A. 
 210. See infra Part II.B. 
 211. See infra Part II.A.1–4. 
 212. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 213. See infra Part II.B.2.c; infra note 285. 
 214. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 215. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 216. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 217. 720 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 218. See id. at 745–47. 
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produced by a generic drug manufacturer from April 2008 to April 2009.219  
The Arkansas District Court originally granted the generic drug 
manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s design 
defect claim against the generic drug manufacturer.220 
In Fullington I, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the appellant’s design 
defect claim from that in Bartlett.221  The court noted that rather than using 
the risk-utility test, Arkansas applies the consumer expectations test to 
determine defect.222  The court held that because of this difference, “it is 
not immediately clear whether Arkansas, unlike New Hampshire, offers 
generic drug manufacturers an opportunity, consistent with federal 
obligations, to somehow alter an otherwise unreasonably dangerous 
drug.”223  Rather than answering this question of law, the court reversed the 
district court’s dismissal of the design defect claim and remanded the case 
back to the district court.224 
2.  Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. 
In Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc.,225 the Eastern District of 
Missouri determined whether federal law preempted a design defect claim 
against a generic drug manufacturer under Kentucky law.226  In Neeley, the 
court noted that Kentucky law, just like the Arkansas law discussed in 
Fullington I, required a court to apply to the consumer expectations test to 
determine defect.227  Relying on Fullington I, the Neeley court stated that 
“it is not immediately clear whether [Kentucky] . . . offers generic drug 
manufacturers an opportunity, consistent with federal obligations, to 
somehow alter an otherwise unreasonably dangerous drug.”228  However, 
without even discussing how the consumer expectations test might affect 
the preemption analysis, the court denied the generic manufacturer’s motion 
to dismiss.229 
3.  Hassett v. Dafoe 
In Hassett v. Dafoe,230 the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined 
whether federal law preempts a design defect claim against a generic drug 
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manufacturer under Pennsylvania law.231  In Hassett, the respondent 
alleged that he suffered tardive dyskinesia due to ingesting MCP.232 
In Hassett, the court analyzed the holding in Bartlett.233  The court stated 
that “[t]he Bartlett court concluded that New Hampshire’s version of 
§ 402A liability did not impose absolute liability on manufacturers, but 
instead, a ‘duty to design [their products] reasonably safely for the uses 
which [they] can foresee.’”234  However, the Hassett court further noted 
that “the Court expressly reserved ‘for another day the question whether a 
true absolute-liability state-law system could give rise to absolute-liability 
pre-emption.’”235 
The court then criticized the “tsunami of cases” that the defendants had 
provided, arguing that these cases had failed to properly identify the “state 
law duties associated with various causes of action and a cogent analysis of 
how they conflict with federal law, which is the hallmark of an 
impossibility pre-emption determination.”236  The court then further 
criticized the defendants, noting that they had not properly appreciated the 
nuance that preemption under Bartlett was “state-law specific.”237  The 
court noted that because the case before the court “involv[ed] more than 
two thousand plaintiffs, many different states’ laws are potentially 
implicated.”238 
The court then analyzed the claims that the plaintiffs asserted in their 
complaint.239  The court stated that the plaintiffs asserted that the drug “has 
never been shown to be either efficacious or safe when used for long-term 
treatment,” “continued to [be] market[ed] . . . despite the fact that there 
were safer and less expensive alternatives available,” and “even when used 
as recommended and with appropriate warnings, was defective and 
unreasonably dangerous.”240 
The Hassett court characterized the plaintiff’s claims as asserting 
absolute liability.241  The court noted that regimes that impose absolute 
liability do not require a court to find that a duty was breached.242  The 
court then noted that because there is no state duty for the federal duty to 
conflict with under an absolute liability regime, the “[d]efendants can 
comply with federal law, which does not permit them to unilaterally alter a 
drug’s design, and state law, which extends liability to a manufacturer of a 
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defectively designed drug without regard to whether it may redesign its 
drug.”243 
Judge William H. Platt filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part.244  In his dissent, Judge Platt argued that the majority failed to 
understand the differences between strict liability and absolute liability.245  
Furthermore, the dissent implied that the majority was hypocritical because, 
while they criticized the appellant for the failure to engage in a proper 
preemption analysis, the majority offered no case law or statutory law 
whatsoever that supported the assertion that the plaintiff’s design defect 
claim survived preemption.246 
Judge Platt then suggested that the majority engaged in judicial activism 
by trying to find absolute liability where there was none.247  Judge Platt 
argued that these claims were preempted despite the majority’s “eclectic 
exegesis” because Congress had regulated generic drugs in this manner.248  
The dissent then identified the majority’s failure to regard any precedent, 
even for persuasive value, that would have altered the outcome of the 
case.249  The dissent continued by quoting Bartlett:  “The dreadful injuries 
from which products liabilities cases arise often engender passionate 
responses.  Today is no exception[.]  But sympathy for [the injured party] 
does not relieve us of the responsibility of following the law.”250 
4.  Guvenoz v. Target Corp. 
In Guvenoz v. Target Corp.,251 the Illinois Appellate Court determined 
whether federal law preempted a plaintiff’s design defect suit against a 
generic drug manufacturer under Illinois law.252  In Guvenoz, the plaintiff 
alleged that the generic drug propoxyphene caused his cardiac arrest.253  
After summarizing the Supreme Court’s holdings in Mensing and Bartlett, 
the court stated that the facts of the case at bar were distinguishable because 
in those cases “the drug was safe for the vast majority of patients taking it, 
and only a ‘very small number of patients’ suffered an adverse and severe 
reaction,” while in the case at bar the “plaintiff alleges that there was no 
group of patients for whom the drug’s benefits outweighed its risks.”254 
In Guvenoz, the drug at issue had been approved by the FDA, was 
ingested by the plaintiff while it was approved, and the plaintiff’s injuries 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 217 (Platt, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 245. See id. at 220 (citing Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 
n.1 (2013)). 
 246. See id. at 220–21. 
 247. See id. 
 248. Id. at 220. 
 249. See id. at 221. 
 250. Id. at 221 (quoting Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2478) (first alteration in original). 
 251. 2015 IL App. (1st) 133940. 
 252. See id. ¶ 44. 
 253. See id. ¶ 10. 
 254. Id. ¶ 72 (quoting Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471). 
2015] BARTLETT GOING FORWARD 351 
occurred while it was approved.255  However, afterwards, the FDA required 
manufacturers to withdraw any products containing propoxyphene due to 
safety studies showing the drug’s adverse impact on electrical activity in the 
heart.256  The court held that because the plaintiff alleged that the “drug was 
simply unsafe and should not have been sold at all” and that “since no 
remedy was possible,” there is no “safe harbor” under Bartlett.257  Because 
the plaintiff claimed that there was no improvement that could be made to 
the design or label that would have resolved the issue, there could not be a 
conflict with the generic drug manufacturer’s requirement to have the same 
design and label as the brand name manufacturer.258  The court noted that 
while Illinois courts use both the consumer expectations test and the risk-
utility test, the result would be the same, as “[f]ederal law does not provide 
the drug companies with a ‘safe harbor’ to avoid liability for dangerous 
drugs, and there was no direct and positive conflict with their federal duty 
of sameness, when the drug should not have been sold.”259 
B.  Courts Finding That Standard of Defectiveness 
Does Not Affect the Preemption Analysis 
The more common trend is for courts to find that Bartlett stands for an 
across-the-board preemption of state design defect causes of action.  Part 
II.B.1 discusses cases holding that federal law preempts design defect 
claims against generic drug manufacturers in jurisdictions applying the 
consumer expectations test.  Part II.B.2 discusses cases holding that federal 
law preempts design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers in 
jurisdictions applying the risk-utility test. 
1.  Consumer Expectations Jurisdictions 
Various courts after Bartlett have held that design defect claims are 
preempted under the consumer expectations test.  The following cases offer 
a detailed explanation regarding this holding.260 
a.  Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc. 
In Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc.,261 the Fourth Circuit determined whether 
federal law preempted a plaintiff’s design defect suit against a generic drug 
manufacturer under Maryland law.262  In Drager, following the ten month 
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use of the generic drug MCP, the appellant developed tardive dyskinesia 
and akathisia.263 
The appellant argued that this case was distinguishable from Bartlett 
because Maryland law applies the consumer expectations test to determine 
“defect.”264  The Drager court rejected this argument and held that the 
difference between the two tests with respect to the impossibility 
preemption analysis is “immaterial.”265 
The court then elaborated by stating that ultimately, the Bartlett Court 
did not determine whether the New Hampshire design defect claim was 
preempted because New Hampshire determined “defect” using the risk-
utility test; rather, “it concluded that there was no action that the defendant 
could take under that approach to increase the safety of its product without 
violating the restrictions of the FDCA.”266  The court noted that Maryland 
also uses both the risk-utility and consumer expectations tests in different 
situations, and Bartlett applied to them similarly in both situations.267  
Under both tests, regardless of what factors make the product defective, 
there is still no action a generic drug manufacturer can take that would 
allow it to comply with both state and federal law.268 
b.  In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing, 
Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation 
In In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices & 
Products Liability Litigation,269 the Southern District of Illinois determined 
whether federal law preempted a plaintiff’s design defect suit under Illinois 
law.270  In In re Yasmin, a plaintiff alleged that she suffered from an acute 
bilateral pulmonary embolus following the consumption of a generic 
version of the drug Yaz.271 
The plaintiff argued that this case was distinguishable from Bartlett 
because Illinois, unlike New Hampshire, used the consumer expectations 
test to determine defect.272  However, the court disagreed, holding “this is a 
distinction without a difference.”273  The court stated that “the two tests are 
not separate theories of liability, but rather two different ways whereby a 
plaintiff can prove the same ground of liability—unreasonable 
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dangerousness.”274  The court held that whether the risk-utility or consumer 
expectations test is used does not change the content of the duty required 
under state law “because the two tests are simply alternative methods” of 
proving breach of duty, rather than the content of the duty.275 
c.  Fullington v. PLIVA, Inc. (Fullington II) 
After the Eighth Circuit in Fullington I held it was uncertain whether 
design defect claims under Arkansas law were preempted after Bartlett,276 
on remand the Eastern District of Arkansas in Fullington v. PLIVA, Inc.277 
(Fullington II) determined whether federal law preempted a plaintiff’s 
design defect suit against a generic drug manufacturer under Arkansas 
law.278 
In determining this issue, the court acknowledged the holding in Drager 
and emphasized that Drager held that the Court in Bartlett did not find that 
federal law preempted state law because it used the risk-utility test; rather, it 
held that federal law preempted state law because the defendant could not 
act in compliance with both state law and FDA regulations.279  Following 
this acknowledgement, the court held that Bartlett is equally applicable 
under the risk-utility test and under Maryland’s consumer expectations 
test.280  The court noted that the drug manufacturer cannot be forced to stop 
selling the product, but also cannot change the chemical composition of the 
product or the product’s labeling.281  The court expanded this holding even 
further, claiming that Bartlett’s logic extends “[r]egardless of the way in 
which [a state] assesses the unreasonableness of a product’s risks.”282  
Ultimately, “a generic drug [must] have the same active ingredients, route 
of administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as the brand-name 
drug,” and thus the generic drug manufacturer cannot change the design; 
similarly, FDA rules prohibit the generic drug manufacturer from changing 
its label and leave market withdrawal, which Bartlett rejected, as the only 
option.283  The court held as a result that it would be impossible for a 
generic drug manufacturer to comply with both state and federal law, and 
“[n]one of [the] reasoning depends on the distinction between the risk-
utility approach and the consumer expectations approach.”284 
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d.  Brinkley v. Pfizer, Inc. 
In December 2014, approximately one and a half years after their 
Fullington I decision, the Eighth Circuit once again spoke on preemption of 
design defect suits against generic drug manufacturers in Brinkley v. Pfizer, 
Inc.285  In Brinkley, the court determined whether federal law preempted a 
design defect claim against a generic drug manufacturer under Missouri 
law.286  The appellant alleged that she had suffered from tardive dyskinesia 
due to her consumption of generic MCP.287 
The court noted that “Missouri courts have consistently refused to 
impose any judicial definition [of unreasonably dangerous] whether derived 
from consumer expectations, risk-utility, or otherwise.”288  Rather, in 
Missouri, “the concept of unreasonable danger . . . is presented to the jury 
as an ultimate issue without further definition,” and the jury may define this 
term based upon the utility and risk of the product, the consumer’s 
expectations, “or any other theory of unreasonable dangerousness supported 
by the evidence.”289  Due to this difference in approaches, the appellant 
argued that Missouri’s “open-ended approach” to determine if a product is 
defective distinguishes this claim from the claim preempted in Bartlett.290 
However, the court rejected the appellant’s argument.291  The court held 
that the appellant “place[d] too much weight on Missouri’s approach to 
determining unreasonable danger.”292  Citing the Fourth Circuit in Drager, 
the court noted that Bartlett did not find the claim was preempted because 
state law applied the risk-utility test.293  Rather, the court found that the 
claim was preempted because “there was no action that the defendant could 
take under that approach to increase the safety of its product without 
violating the restrictions of the FDCA.”294  Therefore, it had “no trouble 
concluding that the same [wa]s true under either the risk-utility or the 
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consumer-expectations approach.”295  Furthermore, the court noted that the 
appellant had not proposed an action, short of stopping the sale of the 
product, that the generic drug manufacturer could have taken to create a 
different result.296 
2.  Risk-Utility Jurisdictions 
Furthermore, courts have found federal law preempts design defect 
claims in jurisdictions that determine defect under different risk-utility tests 
than that used in New Hampshire.  Part II.B.2.a discusses cases holding that 
federal law preempts a design defect suit against generic drug 
manufacturers where state law uses the risk-utility test with an alternative 
design requirement to determine defect.  Part II.B.2.b discusses a case 
holding that federal law preempts a design defect suit against a generic drug 
manufacturer where state law uses the prudent manufacturer test to 
determine defect.  Part II.B.2.c discusses a case holding that federal law 
preempts a design defect suit against generic drug manufacturers where 
state law uses the Restatement (Third)’s variation of the risk-utility test. 
a.  Safe or Safer Alternative Design 
This section discusses cases in which courts have found that federal law 
preempts design defect where defect is determined under a risk-utility test 
that requires proof of a safe or safer alternative design. 
i.  Booker v. Johnson & Johnson 
In Booker v. Johnson & Johnson,297 the Northern District of Ohio 
determined whether the federal law preempted a design defect claim under 
Georgia law.298  In Booker, the plaintiff alleged that her daughter passed 
away as a result of a pulmonary embolism caused by use of a birth control 
patch.299 
First, the court noted that “the essential inquiry” when determining if 
design defect actions are preempted is whether the state law requires an 
actor to engage in certain behavior.300  The court noted that Georgia 
employs a risk-utility test that “emphasize[s] that the key factor to the risk-
utility inquiry is whether ‘an alternative design would have made the 
product safer than the original design and was a marketable reality and 
technologically feasible.’”301 
The court held that requiring a proof of an alternative design would 
mandate that the party change the drug’s composition, which federal law 
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prohibits.302  Thus, federal law preempts the state design defect claim 
because the defendants could not comply with state law without violating 
FDA regulations.303 
ii.  Davis v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 
In Davis v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,304 the Eastern District of 
Louisiana determined whether federal law preempted a design defect claim 
against a generic drug manufacturer under Louisiana law.305  In Davis, the 
plaintiff alleged that following the use of generic levonorgestrel and ethinyl 
estradiol, she developed a pulmonary embolism.306 
The court first identified two prongs that a plaintiff must satisfy in order 
to state a claim under Louisiana law:  “that (1) an alternative design exists, 
and (2) that plaintiff’s damage outweighs both the burden the manufacturer 
would suffer if it were to adopt the alternative and any adverse effect of the 
alternative on the product’s utility.”307  The court held that because federal 
law requires the generic drug manufacturer to have the same composition 
and labeling as the brand name version of the drug, and Louisiana state law 
requires either additional labeling or an alternative design, federal law 
preempts the Louisiana state law.308 
iii.  Johnson v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 
In Johnson v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,309 the Fifth Circuit 
determined whether federal law preempted a design defect claim against a 
generic drug manufacturer under Louisiana law.310  In Johnson, the 
appellant alleged that her use of generic MCP caused her to develop tardive 
dyskinesia.311 
Like in Davis, after identifying Lousiana’s two-prong test, the court held 
that the state design law’s requirements that a generic drug manufacturer 
either change the drug’s composition or labeling conflicted with federal 
law, and therefore the federal law preempted the Louisiana state law.312 
However, the appellant also argued that the state design defect suit was 
not preempted because Louisiana’s design defect test law requires that a 
“safer alternative product” exists and not just a “safer alternative design.”313  
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However, the court refused to answer this claim because the appellant did 
make this allegation in her complaint.314 
b.  The Prudent Manufacturer Test 
In Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,315 the Sixth Circuit 
determined whether federal law preempted a design defect claim under 
Tennessee law.316  In Strayhorn, the appellants alleged that their use of 
generic MCP caused them to develop tardive dyskinesia.317 
The court noted that under the prudent manufacturer test, a court engages 
in a risk-utility analysis.318  The court then held that because the factors that 
a jury considers in a risk-utility test only enabled a generic drug 
manufacturer to avoid liability under state law by changing the drug’s 
composition or warning, federal and state law conflicted.319 
c.  Restatement (Third) Section 6(c):  Products Liability 
On February 28, 2011, ninety-one different plaintiffs from twenty-eight 
different states filed a design defect suit in a Missouri state court, alleging 
in part that they suffered bone fractures from their use of generic 
alendronate sodium.320  After removal to federal court, the U.S. Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation “centralized the action with several other 
Fosamax[]-related lawsuits in a multi-district litigation” in the District 
Court of New Jersey, which found that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ 
claims.321  The plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit.322 
In In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Products Liability Litigation 
(No. II), the Third Circuit determined whether federal law preempted these 
multi-district litigation design defect claims.323  The appellants pled design 
defect claims under the risk-utility theory proposed in section 6(c) of the 
Restatement (Third).324  The court held that because federal law prohibited 
the generic drug manufacturer from changing the drug’s design or label, and 
because the appellants could not identify any other action that the 
defendants could take to comply with both state and federal duties, federal 
law preempted state design defect law.325 
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The court also analyzed the respondents’ argument that courts need to 
engage in a state-by-state analysis in light of Bartlett.326  The court held that 
such an analysis would be unnecessary, as under the laws of the twenty-
eight states at issue, the generic drug manufacturers’ only options would be 
to change the labeling, change the design, or stop selling the product.327 
C.  Commentary 
The scholarship on this issue supports the claim that, in light of Bartlett, 
federal law preempts design defect lawsuits against generic drug 
manufacturers. 
James Beck argues that theories that attempt to distinguish tests for 
defect are “red herring[s].”328  He argues that there are no options allowed 
under federal law or the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that a generic drug 
manufacturer can take regardless of the test for defect that a jurisdiction 
uses.329  He contends that a generic drug manufacturer may only avoid 
design defect liability by changing the drug’s label or design, which federal 
law prohibits, or through withdrawing the drug from the market, which 
Bartlett rejected.330  Because there are no further options available for a 
generic drug manufacturer to take, he argues that all design defect claims 
are preempted.331 
Beck supports the reasoning in Fullington II, claiming that the court there 
“asked the right question”:  “[W]hat [could] the [generic drug 
manufacturers] . . . have done to comply with [state] law without violating 
federal law[?]”332  Beck claims that because there is no positive answer, 
federal law preempts state design defect claims regardless of whether the 
test for defect is risk-utility with alternative design, risk-utility without 
alternative design, or consumer expectations.333  “As long as any theory 
would require a change in design, [it is] preempted because that requires 
prior FDA approval.”334 
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Beck similarly agrees with the court’s analysis in Drager.335  Beck called 
Drager “the first court of appeals to face this false distinction head on and 
identify this non-issue for what it is.”336  Beck argues that Drager correctly 
pointed out that “[i]f the result of a verdict is that, to avoid liability under 
state law, the defendant would have to violate FDA regulations requiring 
[a]gency pre-approval of any alteration of the product’s design, then state 
law is preempted as ‘impossible’ to enforce in the face of supreme federal 
law.”337 
Futhermore, Beck agrees with the court’s analysis in In re Fosamax.338  
Beck argues that the In re Fosamax court was correct because the appellants 
could not articulate a theory of liability that did not depend on the generic 
drug manufacturers changing the drug’s warning, changing the drug’s 
design, or stopping the sale of the product.339 
Beck also rejects the court’s analysis in Hassett.340  Calling the result 
“jaw-dropping,” Beck argues that the Hassett court erred in referring to 
absolute liability and strict liability interchangeably.341  According to Beck, 
the dissent was correct to point out that the majority opinion “almost 
entirely lack[ed] in legal reasoning and violates the mandate that the courts 
‘must adhere to extant Supreme Court jurisprudence.’”342 
Similarly, Beck rejects the court’s analysis in Neeley.343  Beck argues 
that Neeley wrongly distinguished strict liability consumer expectations 
claims from strict liability risk-utility claims in the preemption analysis 
because ultimately the generic drug manufacturer cannot change the design 
under federal law.344 
Finally, Steve McConnell rejects the Illinois Appellate Court’s analysis 
in Guvenoz.345  Calling Guvenoz a clear case of “a court wearing its judicial 
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heart on the sleeves of its judicial robes,” McConnell argues that the 
Guvenoz court’s attempt to distinguish that case from Bartlett ignored the 
preemption principles stated therein.346 
III.  FEDERAL LAW REIGNS SUPREME 
As the Bartlett majority explicitly recognized, the first step in 
determining whether the FDA regulations preempt a state design defect suit 
is to determine the content of the state duties.347  However, courts have 
frequently failed to do so, possibly in an attempt to defy Bartlett and allow 
design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers to continue despite 
FDA regulation.348  This determination of the content of the state duties is 
fundamental in determining whether there is a feasible possibility—besides 
changing a generic drug’s chemical composition, changing a generic drug’s 
labeling, or stopping the sale of the product altogether—that would allow 
the generic drug manufacturer to comply with both their federal and state 
duties.349  Such a finding would prevent a court from concluding that the 
state design defect suit is preempted under physical impossibility conflict 
preemption.350 
This part illustrates how federal law preempts state design defect claims 
against generic drug manufacturers regardless of the test the state court uses 
to determine defectiveness.  First, Part III.A discusses the failure of courts 
to properly identify the content of the duties imposed by state design defect 
law after Bartlett.  Then, Part III.B evaluates the content of state law duties 
under the various different design defect tests and discusses its 
ramifications, if any, on the subsequent physical impossibility analysis, as 
elaborated by Bartlett. 
A.  Identification of State Duties 
This section identifies deficiencies in the approaches that the Neeley, 
Hassett, and Guvenoz courts have taken with respect to the identification of 
the content of state duties.  Part III.A.1 argues that Neeley failed to evaluate 
the defendant’s duties under state law.  Part III.A.2 argues that Hassett 
incorrectly engaged in its analysis of the state duties.  Part III.A.3 argues 
that Guvenoz also incorrectly engaged in its analysis of the state duties. 
1.  Neeley Failed to Undertake an Analysis of the State Duties 
In Neeley, the court failed to properly identify the duties that Arkansas 
design defect law actually imposed upon a generic drug manufacturer.  In 
Neeley, the District Court relied on the Eighth Circuit’s determination in 
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Fullington I that “it is not immediately clear” that federal law preempted 
Arkansas’s design defect law, which applies a consumer expectations test, 
because Bartlett’s preemption analysis was with respect to New Hampshire 
design defect law, which follows a risk-utility test.351  While Fullington I 
ultimately remanded that determination to the District Court, Neeley merely 
cited Fullington I and engaged in no further analysis.352 
This deference to Fullington I is defective for two reasons.  First, the 
Fullington I court remanded the actual analysis of state duties to the district 
court; it was the district court in Fullington II that engaged in the state 
duties analysis.353  Thus, the Neeley court had made this non-preemption 
determination without itself analyzing the state duties, or deferring to a 
court that had made such an analysis.  Second, as shown below in Part 
III.B.1, jurisdictions determining defect under a consumer expectations 
analysis are preempted in light of the Court’s analysis in Bartlett.354 
2.  Hassett Improperly Engaged in an Analysis of the State Duties 
In Hassett, the court failed to properly identify the duties that 
Pennsylvania design defect law actually imposed upon a generic drug 
manufacturer.  The Hassett court found that federal law did not preempt the 
design defect claims because the state design defect law did not actually 
impose any duty upon the generic drug manufacturer.355  However, this is 
an inaccurate portrayal of Pennsylvania law and strict liability. 
Hassett correctly held that a claim imposing true absolute liability on 
generic drug manufacturers would not be preempted after Bartlett,356 but 
incorrectly held that Pennsylvania design defect law imposed true absolute 
liability.  Under true absolute liability, a court will not look to the condition 
of the product when determining whether the manufacturer is liable.357  By 
contrast, under strict liability regimes, the evaluation of defectiveness, 
whether it be under a risk-utility test, a consumer expectations test, a 
hybrid, or any new derivation that should arise, is a determination of 
whether the generic drug manufacturer breached its duty under state law.358  
By requiring “defect” to be found before a defendant becomes liable, a 
court determines whether the manufacturer did in fact fail to adhere to a 
legal duty to design a product without “defect,” regardless of how “defect” 
may be defined or interpreted, so long as it requires the generic drug 
manufacturer not to produce a product in a certain non-conforming 
condition.359  Bartlett has explicitly stated that this duty is to be viewed as a 
 
 351. See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra notes 278–84 and accompanying text. 
 354. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 355. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text. 
 356. See infra Part III.B.5. 
 357. See supra notes 149–61 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 92–93, 155–56 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 92–93, 155–56 and accompanying text. 
362 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
legal requirement.360  Because this duty is a legal requirement, and because 
that requirement under state law makes it impossible for a generic drug 
manufacturer to comply with federal law, federal law must preempt state 
law.361 
3.  Guvenoz Improperly Engaged in an Analysis of the State Duties 
In Guvenoz, the generic drug manufacturer had received FDA approval, 
but following new information, the FDA dropped its approval of the 
drug.362  Based largely upon those facts, Guvenoz held that because the 
plaintiffs alleged that there was no way that the drug could have been 
altered to be safely produced, there was no requirement that conflicted with 
federal law.363 
The Guvenoz court failed to properly engage in a state duties analysis 
because it looked to the content of the drug, rather than the content of state 
law.  As shown in Bartlett, a court determines the content of the state duty 
by determining what actions the party must undertake in order to avoid 
liability.364  However, the analysis does not look to whether an individual 
party can in fact comply with its state duty due to its own particular 
circumstances.365  Impossibility preemption requires a court to determine 
what the law requires a party to do, not what is feasible for a party to do 
under its unique circumstances.366 
B.  Physical Impossibility and Different Defect Tests 
As shown above, the determination that a product is defective is a 
determination of whether a state law duty has been breached.367  Under 
Bartlett, federal law preempts state law under physical impossibility 
preemption when the state duty required by design defect law forces a 
behavior contrary to federal law’s “sameness” requirement towards generic 
drug manufacturers and where the only option for the generic drug 
manufacturer to avoid liability is to stop the sale of the drug completely.368  
Any test for defect—whether it be through the risk-utility test’s variations, 
the consumer expectations test, a hybrid, or any new variation—will still 
require the generic drug manufacturer to engage in behavior that leaves 
“stop selling” as the only viable alternative.369  State design defect claims 
of any jurisdiction that require a finding of defectiveness, no matter the 
 
 360. See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text.  This Note does not address the 
validity of this assumption. 
 361. See supra notes 187–88, 201–08 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra notes 257–59 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra notes 184–97 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra notes 184–97 and accompanying text. 
 366. See supra notes 76–97 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra notes 92–93, 155–56 and accompanying text. 
 368. See supra notes 195–208 and accompanying text. 
 369. See infra Part III.B.1–4. 
2015] BARTLETT GOING FORWARD 363 
content of the test, will therefore be preempted by federal generic drug 
regulations.370 
This section more carefully analyzes these distinctions between 
jurisdictions and applies preemption principles to these differences.  Part 
III.B.1 discusses preemption of design defect suits against generic drug 
manufacturers in consumer expectations jurisdictions.  Part III.B.2 
discusses preemption of design defect suits against generic drug 
manufacturers in risk-utility test jurisdictions with an alternative design 
requirement.  Part III.B.3 discusses preemption of design defect suits 
against generic drug manufacturers in prudent manufacturer test 
jurisdictions.  Part III.B.4 discusses preemption of design defect suits 
against generic drug manufacturers under the Restatement (Third)’s test.  
Finally, Part III.B.5 discusses preemption of design defect suits against 
generic drug manufacturers under a true absolute liability regime. 
1.  Consumer Expectations 
Post-Bartlett, federal law preempts design defect claims against generic 
drug manufacturers in jurisdictions that determine defectiveness via the 
consumer expectations test.  As established above, a jurisdiction that 
determines defectiveness under a consumer expectations test will ask a jury 
to determine what a reasonable consumer would expect regarding the safety 
of the product.371  This ultimately imposes a duty on generic drug 
manufacturers in such jurisdictions to design the generic drug to be as safe 
as a reasonable consumer would expect it to be.372 
In order to avoid preemption in these jurisdictions, a plaintiff must show 
that there is some behavior that the generic drug manufacturer can engage 
in which would not expose the generic drug manufacturer to liability, other 
than refraining from selling the drug.373  Thus, this invites the critical 
question:  How may a generic drug manufacturer alter a consumer’s 
expectations regarding the safety of a generic drug without changing the 
drug’s warnings, changing the drug’s actual composition, or stopping the 
sale of the drug completely? 
Because they properly follow the word of Bartlett, courts like the 
Fullington II court are correct when they hold that there is in fact no other 
route that a generic drug manufacturer can take with regard to the design of 
its product to avoid liability, without refraining from selling the drug.374  As 
correctly noted in In re Yasmin, while the risk-utility test and consumer 
expectations tests allow a reasonable person to consider different factors to 
determine whether the design is “defective,” ultimately, the only way that 
the generic drug manufacturer would be able to change the reasonable 
consumer’s expectations would be to change the drug’s composition, 
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change its labeling, or stop selling the product.375  No court has yet to 
accept any theory as to any further option that the generic drug 
manufacturer could undertake to avoid liability.376 
2.  Risk-Utility Test Requiring a Safe or Safer Alternative Design 
Jurisdictions that require the finding that there exists a safe or safer 
alternative design under a risk-utility test before a breach of duty can be 
found are preempted following Bartlett.  Jurisdictions that impose such a 
requirement may only have valid claims when a generic drug manufacturer 
feasibly could have distributed its drug to the public by some alternative 
method that would have allowed the product to be deemed “safe,” or 
“safer” than its present state.377 
As stated in Booker, Davis, and Johnson, the alternative design 
requirement, where implemented, is a part of the risk-utility test.378  Despite 
the fact that in some jurisdictions, as in Booker, alternative design will be a 
factor (albeit a large one in the risk-utility test) and in some jurisdictions, 
like in Johnson and Davis, it consists of one prong, both should be 
preempted similarly.379  Ultimately, by determining defectiveness under 
any risk-utility test, these jurisdictions all impose a duty upon the 
manufacturer, much like the New Hampshire law in Bartlett, to design 
products that are reasonably safe.380  Regardless of the factors used to 
evaluate what is “reasonably safe” in the risk-utility test, the only way the 
generic drug manufacturer could change a reasonable person’s evaluation of 
these factors would be to change a drug’s composition, change the drug’s 
labeling, or refrain from selling the drug.381 
3.  Prudent Manufacturer Test 
Federal law preempts design defect suits in jurisdictions applying the 
prudent manufacturer test after Bartlett.  These jurisdictions apply a risk-
utility test, but assume that defendants knew of the product’s condition.382 
The attribution of knowledge to the manufacturer plays no additional role 
in the analysis of state law duties after Bartlett.  The knowledge 
requirement serves to impute an understanding of the risks of the drug upon 
the manufacturer,383 but like the traditional risk-utility test, while different 
factors or considerations may ultimately identify whether the generic drug 
is safe, the ways in which the generic drug manufacturer can alter the 
perception of these factors can solely be accomplished by changing the 
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composition, changing the labeling, or ceasing sale of the product.384  The 
hindsight test might ultimately change the standard that a judge instructs to 
a jury,385 but it offers no additional option as to how a drug manufacturer 
can avoid liability besides the option rejected in Bartlett.386 
4.  Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) 
Federal law preempts design defect claims where the test for defect is 
designated by Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third).  Ultimately, a 
generic drug manufacturer can only avoid state liability under this test when 
the benefits are greater than the risks for some class of person.387  The 
benefits and risks, as seen in Bartlett, can only be altered by changing the 
drug label, changing the drug composition, or stopping the sale of the 
drug.388 
5.  True Absolute Liability Regimes 
As Hassett stated, Bartlett suggests that design defect claims in true 
absolute liability regimes remain viable.389  The application of this theory is 
in fact viable, because true absolute liability regimes, unlike strict liability 
regimes, do not impose duties upon manufacturers.390  Rather, because they 
find liability regardless of whether the manufacturer produced a defective 
product, they do not impose any duty on the manufacturer at all, because 
the law does not require the manufacturer to provide a reasonably safe 
product.391 
In Bartlett, the majority found that the “requirement” imposed by state 
tort law equated to the duty imposed by state tort law.392  Without such a 
duty, however, there cannot be a “requirement” imposed by state law.393  
Thus, the state duty necessary to find physical impossibility conflict 
preemption would not exist, leaving the absolute liability design defect 
claim not preempted under Bartlett.394  When there is no state requirement, 
logically there cannot be conflicting federal and state standards.395 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately for consumers of FDA-approved drugs, state strict liability 
design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers are preempted no 
matter which test for defect is used.  Ultimately, the legal formulation for 
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defect, no matter how defect is defined, will only be able to be altered by 
changing the drug’s label, changing the drug’s composition, or having the 
drug company refrain from selling the drug at all.  This is exactly why the 
Court in Bartlett found federal law preempted a design defect claim under 
New Hampshire law, and this logic applies equally to all other state design 
defect laws applying strict liability principles.  However, there is an 
opening for design defect claims under true absolute liability regimes.  
These regimes, because they do not require the finding of “defect,” do not 
impose a state duty, rendering physical impossibility preemption an 
impossibility. 
